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For most of modern American history, the spread between the average real return 
on an equity-market portfolio and the real risk-free rate has been significantly larger than 
financial theory and traditional finance models would have predicted.1 This observation 
was first made in 1985 and dubbed the "Equity Premium Puzzle" by Rajnish Mehra and 
Edward C. Prescott.2 Since that time, academics and practitioners from the fields of 
finance, economics and even accounting have struggled to determine: (1) how high the 
equity premium was during various periods; (2) why it differed from what financial 
theory would have predicted, if it did; and (3) what we can reasonably expect it to do in 
the future. Integrally related to all of these issues is the question how the equity premium 
should be measured. 
This paper analyzes a sample of the body of literature on this controversial subject 
and concludes that the methodology first used to quantify the equity premium itself 
created the puzzle. In other words, the question should not have been, as was asked 
initially and assumed to have been correct for many years, why have observed returns 
been so much higher than theory would have predicted. Rather, the appropriate inquiry 
should have been to what extent did expected equity returns in the past differ from what 
financial theory would have predicted. Asked this way, no puzzle is immediately 
evident. On the contrary, it appears that the market at all relevant times expected returns 
essentially identical to what financial theory predicted it should. The fact that the 
American equity market delivered returns vastly greater than were expected is irrelevant 
to this question. Expectations do not necessarily come to fruition; actual returns may 
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differ greatly and, apparently, they have for much of American history. In essence, actual 
returns in the American stock market throughout much of the twentieth century simply 
reflect "a large unexpected capital gain."3 
SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH 
Identification of the "Equity Premium Puzzle" 
In 1985, Mehra and Prescott observed that the historical average return on equity 
greatly exceeded the average return on short-term, essentially risk-free debt.4 Studying 
the ninety-year period from 1889 to 1978 ex post, they calculated the real annual yield on 
the S&P index to be 7%, which exceeded the real return on short-term debt by over 6%. 
They further concluded that this differential could not be accounted for with traditional 
models and that some other model would be necessary to explain the phenomenon, or the 
"equity premium puzzle" as they dubbed it. Their work led to a significant body of 
research not only by other economists, but also by researchers from other areas of 
academia and practice, including areas as divergent in their approaches as finance and 
accounting. For the seventeen years that followed, researchers have struggled: (1) to 
confirm or disprove the existence of the puzzle; (2) to explain why it existed, if it did; and 
(3) to identify the future implications of their respective findings. 
Early Research: The Search for a Cause Ex Post 
Assuming the equity market's actual returns ex post reflect the appropriate 
perspective, the question remains: Why has the equity premium been so high? One 
possible explanation is survivorship bias. Brown, Goetzmann and Ross argued that any 
empirical analysis of rates of return ex post implicitly conditions data on each security 
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surviving into the sample so as to be suitable for inclusion.5 The effect of this bias 
naturally becomes more profound to the extent researchers attempt to bolster their work 
by including longer sequences of market data. Accordingly, they observed, one would 
expect that emerging capital markets would demonstrate significant equity premiums. 
While not discouraging the use of historical data, they admonished researchers to beware 
the existence of this bias in ex post analyses of observed market returns. While the 
absolute magnitude of this bias may be debated, the conclusion is logically inescapable 
both that historical returns implicitly include survivorship bias and that the bias is greater 
to the extent that researchers demand that their data span longer historical periods. 
Whether the magnitude of this bias materially affects research results is a closer question. 
In 1999, based on a similar ex post analysis, Siegel argued that a 5% to 6% equity 
premium is neither reflective of the true historical experience, nor realistically attainable 
over the next 30 years.6 He examined an even longer historical period for realized 
returns, 196 years, and argued that previous estimates of the historical equity premium 
simply overestimated it. According to Siegel, two factors contributed to this. First, the 
relatively short, 50-year time period previously used by researchers provided an 
unreasonably low return on fixed-income assets. Two possible reasons for this, he 
suggested, were bursts of unanticipated inflation following World War II and during the 
1970s, and the abandonment of the gold standard. Second, he observed that realized 
returns on American equities may systematically overestimate the market's expected 
returns. Although he suggested that survivorship bias may contribute to this problem, he 
argued that controlling for survivorship bias alone cannot yield an accurate estimate of 
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realized equity returns. Rather, one must also account for higher transactional costs and 
the consequent choice between expensive diversification and idiosyncratic risk without 
diversification. Bearing these additional factors in mind, he estimated that actual realized 
equity returns were "more in the neighborhood of 5% to 6% over most of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century rather than the 7% calculated from indexes."7 
Finally, Siegel went a step further and addressed the future implications of his 
analysis for the equity premium. He observed that the then-current P-E ratio of the 
market based on reported earnings was already at the record level of 32. Based on basic 
fundamental analysis, he then noted two long-term consequences of high stock prices 
relative to earnings: (1) either future stock returns must be lower than the historical 
averages; or (2) earnings must rise at a more rapid rate in the future, and he saw no 
reason to believe this would occur. Accordingly, he opined that future stock returns 
simply must be lower than the historical average if future dividends grow no faster than 
they have in the past. 
Siegel explicitly addressed the unreasonable premises implicit in simply assuming 
that the historically realized equity premium will continue indefinitely: 
All of this makes it very surprising that Ivo Welch [1999] in a 
survey of over 200 academic economists finds that most estimate the 
equity premium at 5 to 6 percentage points over the next thirty years. 
Such a premium would require a 9% to 10% real return on stocks, given 
the current real yield on Treasury inflation-indexed securities. This means 
that real per share dividends would have to grow by nearly 8.0% to 9.0% 
per year, given the current 1.2% dividend yield, to prevent the P-E ratio 
from rising farther from its current record levels. This growth rate is more 
than six times the growth rate of real dividends since 1871 and more than 
triple their growth rate since the end of World War II.8 
Of course, fundamentals do not exist in a vacuum and should not be assumed to be fixed. 
The existence of a high equity premium may make it marginally more likely that 
fundamentals will justify the premium. As Fama and French observed in 2000, the equity 
premium has at least two relevant effects: (1) the market demands growth; and (2) firms 
respond to the market by looking harder for growth opportunities.9 
Recent Research: Questioning the Puzzle's Existence Ex Ante 
The majority of early work on the subject proceeded from the implicit premise 
that an ex post analysis of realized returns may be probative of the market's expectations 
ex ante. Certainly a mathematical calculation of returns from widely available data is the 
most expedient method of approaching the question. The assumption, however, that 
expected and realized returns meaningfully relate to and reflect each other, particularly in 
the American equities market during the historical period in which this nation rose to 
world dominance, is dubious at best. On the contrary, it is at least intuitively pleasing to 
believe, if not likely, that the market simply enjoyed gains of an unexpected magnitude 
during this period. It is this central assumption on which researchers have focused most 
recently. The implication of their collective work in this area is a bold one: The equity 
premium may not be a puzzle after all. 
In 1993, Blanchard attempted to study the market's expectations ex ante, so as to 
calculate the market's expectations at the relevant times, i.e., when market players make 
presumably rational investment decisions.10 Rather than simply relying on traditional, 
average historical rates of return for debt and equity ex post, he examined historical 
information to deduce the market's expectations. Specifically, he calculated the expected 
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real rates of return on debt using commercial forecasts of inflation available for the 
historical period he studied. With respect to equities, he calculated implicit expected 
rates of return essentially by equating prices with future dividend payments discounted to 
present value by a rate for which he solved. 
Blanchard observed that the equity premium had generally decreased steadily 
from the 1950s. By the early 1990s, the author calculated that the equity premium had 
dropped to approximately 2% to 3%. This trend, he noted, was a product of both 
reductions in real equity returns and increases in real bond rates throughout the world. 
Blanchard then attempted to rule out several possible causes for these trends, including 
changing levels of government debt and the relative riskiness of stocks and bonds. He 
noted, however, that institutional investors had steadily increased their collective share of 
the equities market from 1% in 1950 to nearly 30% by the date of publication. This flow 
of capital and concomitant long-term investment horizon, he intimated, might both be 
expected in light of such a high historical equity premium and explain its reduction by 
reference to upward equity price movements over time. 
Based on his analysis, he ultimately concluded that the market's long-term 
expectations with respect to inflation primarily explain the long-term increase in real 
bond rates. This, in turn, primarily accounted for the decrease in the equity premium. 
Shortly after the great depression, the market expected long-term inflationary pressures to 
be significantly higher than were experienced for most of the period that followed. 
Accordingly, as inflation over time did not rise to the level that the market had expected, 
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real bond rates proved higher than expected ex ante. Thus, he reasoned that the equity 
premium should remain at the then-current low level, assuming inflation remained low. 
In 2001, Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan examined the issue from an accounting 
perspective and suggested that the "puzzle" might be resolved by rejecting the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) itself and, indeed, the relevance of beta to expected returns 
generally.11 Using a large sample of over 1000 firms and a relatively short time period, 
1979 to 1995, they articulated "a new approach to estimating the cost of equity capital."12 
Specifically, they used a discounted residual income model (RIM) to discern the internal 
rate of return (IRR) that equates present stock prices to the present value of expected 
future cash flows for each firm. This IRR, they reasoned, is the market's expected return 
on equity ex ante. Thus, rather than examine what the market should be doing at any 
given time, they examine what the market in fact is doing. Based on this analysis, they 
noted that market equity prices reflected an equity premium ex ante of only 2% to 3%, far 
less than the 7% that typically flows from historical ex post analyses of realized returns. 
Perhaps their most significant finding, however, was that a "surprisingly weak"13 
correlation exists between firms' implied cost of capital and the volatility of their stock 
prices. Based on this finding, they concluded that the usefulness of beta in pricing 
equities is significantly overstated in traditional finance theory. Quite to the contrary, 
they observed that the expectations of practitioners for firms' returns appear to relate 
much more to three variables, even controlling for industry effects: (1) book-to-market 
ratios; (2) forecasted growth rates; and (3) dispersion in analysts' forecasts. Beta, they 
found, appeared to function largely as a proxy for industry membership and lost its 
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significance once industry membership was controlled. Thus, they concluded that CAPM 
is of extremely limited value to practitioners, if any. 
Of course, this new approach is not without its problems. Notably, the 
researchers recognized that their analysis itself depends on a number of "simplifying 
assumptions." The most significant of these assumptions is that earnings forecasts, 
dividend payout ratios and terminal value calculations reflect an accurate picture of the 
future, or at least the market's expectations of that future. A strong positive attribute of 
their approach, however, is that their use of a fairly short time period allows the creation 
of a moving model that reflects current market sentiment and expectations. This is far 
more useful in estimating a firm's true cost of capital for budgeting decisions than a 
CAPM approach reflecting essentially decades of historical experience. By extension, 
their model allows one to calculate a more relevant and timely market equity risk 
premium because it looks to the market's expectations ex ante. Nevertheless, calculation 
of the equity premium was not the explicit purpose of their work. 
By contrast, the equity premium was the central focus of Claus and Thomas that 
same year.15 Also using a RIM approach, they calculated the discount rates implied from 
market stock prices and analysts' forecasts with respect to cash flows. Like Gebhardt, 
Lee and Swaminathan, they used short time-series data relative to traditional calculations 
of historical returns, but argued persuasively that the RIM method makes such a long 
series of data unnecessary. Moreover, they noted, imposing such a requirement on one's 
data prevents similar calculations for equities traded on most other world markets. Thus, 
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their approach can be replicated throughout the world and is therefore more relevant to 
the global capital market throughout which investment decisions are made. 
Indeed, they applied their model to five other developed nations and the results 
confirmed their conclusions. Ultimately, they made explicit the implicit suggestion of 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan that the "equity premium puzzle" may not even exist 
because: (1) CAPM may not truly reflect market expectations; and/or (2) an ex post 
analysis of historical returns in the American equities market probably overestimates the 
premium expected by the market ex ante. Finally, they reiterated Siegel's admonition 
that no principled fundamental analysis can support a 7% equity premium in the future. 
Rather, they concluded that a premium of roughly 3% is far more realistic and appears to 
have been priced into the market already. 
Employing a similar methodology, Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina 
studied the trend of the equity premium from 1926 to 1999.16 They calculated that, 
although it averaged roughly 7% from 1926 to 1970, it averaged only 0.7% from 1970 
onward and, in fact, has been near zero for roughly the last twenty years. Based on these 
findings, they presented several possible reasons for the premium, all of which constitute 
market imperfections. The imperfections that may have been responsible for the high 
equity premium of the past were systematically eliminated or at least reduced at the same 
time the equity premium was decreasing from 7% to near zero. Thus, at least a generally 
correlative relationship substantiates the plausibility of this hypothesis. 
In particular, they argue that the market imperfections that drove the equity 
premium upward, and the elimination of which reduced the premium, were at least three-
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fold: (1) the inability of investors to insure fully against major risks outside the stock 
markets; (2) transactional costs, both direct and indirect; and (3) incomplete knowledge 
about investment opportunities. Because the market recognizes and accounts for these 
imperfections, they add, it demands higher returns in exchange for investing in risky 
assets. Particularly as a result of technological advances over the last thirty years, they 
observe, each of these factors has been reduced as an obstacle to investing. Nevertheless, 
they caution that much more work must be done to derive a definitive explanation for the 
premium's decline and that this was not the purpose of their research. 
Their calculations of the premium ex ante reveal that the equity premium is now 
approximately the magnitude that traditional financial theory suggests it should be: near 
zero. Again, viewing the issue from the appropriate perspective, that of the market as it 
looks to the future and makes investment decisions based on then-available information, 
it appears that no equity premium "puzzle" exists at all. Rather, this research illustrates 
that the "puzzle" was essentially a non-issue motivated largely by a desire to calculate the 
equity premium based on historically observed returns ex post. 
Thus, they reiterate the warning that reliance on historical averages is likely to 
disappoint investors who simply assume that past experiences should translate into 
reasonable expectations for the future. In this regard, they note that even standard 
finance textbooks blindly extrapolate past returns forward to generate an equity premium 
as high as 9.2%. To justify this number, they add, one must assume long-term growth 
rates in dividends or earnings much faster than the growth of GNP, and this is simply 
unreasonable. Finally, the authors performed several sensitivity analyses to determine 
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the extent to which their conclusions might be affected by mistaken assumptions. 
Specifically, they tested for changes in dividend growth rates, dividend yields and bond 
yields. Somewhat surprisingly, they found that manipulating these assumptions did not 
materially alter their conclusions. 
In 2002, Fama and French further compared and contrasted the outcomes of 
calculating the equity premium through average returns ex post with two methodologies 
for calculating it ex ante, the dividend-growth model and the earnings-growth model, 
both of which they believe produce unconditional expected stock returns.17 They note 
that, although the two ex ante methods produced different estimates of the equity 
premium, they were both relatively similar to each other and significantly lower than the 
estimates produced by the average-return method ex post. This result is not particularly 
surprising, given the upward bias that is apparently inherent in the average-return method 
as applied to the modern American capital markets. 
They further acknowledge a controversial, but potential, danger in relying upon 
analysts' forecasts of growth rates to generate cash-flow predictions for their dividend-
growth and earnings-growth models. Namely, analysts' forecasts may cause systematic 
overestimation of the equity premium due to certain institutional biases related to the 
investment banks with which they are affiliated. As a result, their published expectations 
may tend to be more optimistic than those of a truly neutral observer. Thus, they use 
average dividend and earnings growth rates without reference to analysts' forecasts. 
They argue that the average-returns method overestimates the equity premium and 
disregards the market's true expectations for three reasons. First, the ex ante methods are 
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more precise and have significantly lower standard errors than the average-return method. 
Second, they calculated the Sharpe ratios for each method over time and found that the 
ratios from the ex ante methods were much more stable than the average-returns method. 
This was significant, they argued, because the Sharpe ratio relates to aggregate risk 
aversion, which should be relatively stable over time. The changes to the Sharpe ratio 
that flow from the average-returns method would indicate that the market was nearly 
twice as risk averse during the more recent period from 1951 to 2000 than it was from 
1872 to 1950, a result they consider to be simply implausible. Third, the behavior of 
other fundamentals, like book-to-market ratios, suggests that the ex ante methods are 
more robust. Thus, they conclude, to the extent that average returns over the last fifty 
years exceeded the market's expectations according to the dividend-growth and earnings-
growth methods, this simply represents an unexpected capital gain. 
SYNTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The assumption that what is observed ex post was necessarily expected by the 
market ex ante reflects a fundamental logical flaw. This error in reasoning led to the 
creation of the so-called "equity premium puzzle." Expectations and actual results do not 
necessarily resemble each other and, indeed, rarely do. Particularly where researchers 
use actual returns on American equities traded during a period in which the country rose 
to prominence and, ultimately, world domination, actual returns should and apparently do 
systematically overstate the market's expectations. 
Moreover, the ex ante method offers a significant advantage impossible under the 
historical method: The results of this research may be replicated using market data 
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reflecting the economies of other major, industrialized nations with sophisticated capital 
markets. The historical-returns method requires many years of data. Unfortunately, the 
capital markets in the United States are the only ones in the world for which continuous, 
reliable data exist throughout most of the twentieth century. Other markets, even those in 
highly developed, mature European countries, were interrupted for considerable periods 
during wars, most notably World War II. Therefore, proponents of the historical-returns 
method essentially claim a "pass" on the basic tenet of research that findings should be 
replicated. The robustness of the expected-returns methods, by contrast, has been 
replicated throughout five other nations with the unanimous result that the historical 
method overstates the equity premium by approximately 6%. 
Several possible reasons possibly account for the equity premium, whichever way 
it is defined. If one defines it in terms of average historical returns, survivorship bias 
and, quite simply, luck may explain it. Using either a dividend-growth or an earnings-
growth model to deduce implied market expectations, rather than simply calculating 
average historical returns, avoids this pitfall. Simply relying on an ex ante approach, 
however, also exposes the researcher to potential biases, particularly in the assumptions 
on which future cash flows are estimated. Assuming one defines the premium in terms of 
expected returns implied from analyst forecasts and prevailing market prices, biases 
inherent in analysts' predictions may tend to cause an overestimation of expected returns. 
To the extent that analysts paint unrealistically rosy pictures of earnings and dividend 
growth, it necessarily implies that the discount rate that will equate those cash flows to 
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the present stock price must be higher. Accordingly, one can control for and eliminate 
this potential bias by relying on other estimations of dividend and earnings growth. 
To the extent that historical returns since the 1920s indicate an 8% average return, 
this cannot possibly be supported by any reasonable assumptions about growth rates and 
other fundamentals into the future. Thus, even if the expected equity premium were 
accurately reflected by observed historical returns, and by its own terms it is not 
necessarily so reflected, no reasonable investor should expect such a high premium in the 
future. Accordingly, even if one assumes that investors expected an 8% equity premium 
in the past, he or she must acknowledge that the equity premium is lower now or soon 
will be. An investor's belief as to whether the market has already priced in reasonable 
expectations as to the equity premium will influence his or her approach to investing. 
If one believes that the premium has yet to decline to lower levels, he or she 
should invest heavily in equities because a drop in the equity premium implies an 
increase in stock prices. Alternatively, if one believes the equity premium already 
reflects reasonable estimates of future fundamentals, as is likely in an efficient market, he 
or she will not necessarily dive into a long position in the equities market to a greater 
extent than usual. Rather, an investor confident in the efficiency of the American capital 
markets will continue to make rational decisions based on reasonable projections of 
future cash flows and an expected rate of return, as generations of investors have done 
before. This is the more likely scenario of the two. To the extent that a higher risk 
premium was demanded in the past due to market imperfections, those imperfections, 
particularly with respect to information and transactional costs, have in all material 
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respects been systematically and effectively eliminated from the American capital 
markets. Because our markets are the most efficient in the world, these beneficial 
changes should have been reflected in prices for many years and it appears that they have 
been.19 Of course, the contrary is also true: To the extent that beliefs about the level of 
imperfections in the American capital markets become more pessimistic, prices must 
drop to reflect a higher risk premium. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that the equity premium that investors truly expect in return for 
shouldering risk is not actually 6% to 8%, as an ex post analysis of historical average 
returns would indicate. Rather, based on a more relevant ex ante analysis of the expected 
returns implied by projected cash flows and market prices, the premium appears to be 
much lower and closer to what financial theory would predict. In particular, a significant 
and growing body of research indicates that the equity premium is between 2% and zero 
currently and should remain there through the foreseeable future. This is because, to the 
extent the premium was higher in the past, the market imperfections that justified it, like 
transaction costs and scarce information, have been significantly reduced and are 
expected to remain low. 
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